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R. DREW GRIFFITH
On the last occasion when I had the good fortune to read E. R. Dodds*
famous essay, "On Misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex*"} I felt certain
misgivings at some of his conclusions. E>odds, it will be remembered, is
denouncing a view that he discovered in some undergraduate essays on the
question, "In what sense, if in any, does the Oedipus Rex attempt to justify
the ways of God to man?" The offending view^ holds that "we get what we
deserve,"^ that is, that Oedipus in some measure merits his suffering.
Dodds' position in answer to this has an ethical aspect (Oedipus has an
"essential moral innocence"*), a reUgious one (Sophocles* "gods are [not] in
any human sense just"^) and a literary-critical one ("there is no reason at all
why we should require a dramatist—even a Greek dramatist—to be for ever
running about delivering banal "messages*"^). Many have anticipated Dodds
^ E. R. Dodds. "On Misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex," G&R 13 (1966) 37^9 = The
Ancient Concept of Progress (Oxford 1973) 64-77, dted henceforth as Dodds. The article
has been dted frequently and anthologised at least twice, in M. J. O'Brien (ed.). Twentieth
Century Interpretations of Oedipus Rex (Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1968) 17-29 and H. Bloom
(ed). Modern Critical Interpretations: Sophocles' Oedipus Rex (New York 1988) 35-47.
A version of this paper was read at Concordia University in Montreal on March 4, 1991.
I am grateful for much helpful critidsm and advice to the audience on that occasion as well
as to Christopher G. Brown, Gloria D'Ambrosio-Griffith, Emmet Robbins, Ruth Scodd and
the editors of ICS, whose kind assistance in no way implies that they assent to the view
expressed here.
^ Dodds identifies and refutes two futther views (that the OT is a tragedy of fate and that
Sophocles, as a pure artist, does not concern himself with morality or religion at all),
which, since they are mutually exdusive of the view I support, I join him in rejecting.
' Dodds 37 = 64.
* Dodds 42 = 69.
^ Dodds 47 = 75.
^ Dodds 45 = 73. Dodds holds a similar view of Aesch. Eum.; he wrote in "Morals and
Politics in the Oresteia," in The Ancient Concept of Progress (above, note 1) 47-48:
"Nearly everyone agrees . . . that there is a political point here; but after a century of
controversy there is still no agreement on what the point is. I believe myself that this it
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in his position'' and others have followed him,' with very few dissenting.'
This position is consonant with the emotional reaction of anyone watching
or reading the play. Our sympathies are with Oedipus: We feel terror and
pity at his plight and this makes us want him to be innocent and his
persecutor, Apollo, to be unaccountably vicious. This emotional reaction is
important, because Greek tragedy is an emotional medium.^^
Tragedy is also, however, an intellectual art-form and the intellectual
clarification of the concepts of terror and pity is arguably as much a part of
tragic catharsis as is any psychological purgation through terror and pity.^^
As well as feeling for Oedipus, we must analyze his situation. Texts
contemporary with Sophocles suggest that, while feeling about the play
much as we do, many members of its original audience would have
questioned Dodds' analysis. Oedipus has no essence beyond what we can
infer from the deeds that he performs and, of these, Sophocles*
contemporaries will have found some morally innocent and others not
Apollo's actions, meanwhile, will have seemed to them to be just in an all-
too-human sense. The present article is devoted to the analysis of the roles
of Oedipus and Apollo in the play along lines suggested by fifth-century
thought
I
Beyond doubt, Oedipus suffers greatly in Sophocles' play. He has been
living in a state of incest and he blinds himself in order to be unable to see
the children conceived in pollution (lines 1273-74, 1369-90). He is
undoubtedly not responsible for his incest and the pain that he experiences is
innocent suffering. The presence of this innocent suffering explains our
sympathy for his actions, but should not cloud our analysis of them.
If there is any additional suffering that Oedipus has merited, it must be
because he has done something. He is not likely punished for a character-
exactly what the poet would have wished: he was writing a political play, yes; but a
propagandist play, no."
''Of these, Dodds mentions (38 = 65) especially U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendoiff,
"Excurse zum Oedipus des Sophokles," Hermes 34 (1899) 55-80 = Kleine Schrifien VI
209-33. He also (42 = 69) sees similarities between his view and those of Whitman,
Waldock, Letters, Ehienberg, Knox and Kirkwood.
' R. P. Winnington-Ingram, Sophocles: An Interpretation (Cambridge 1980) 203, and
R. D. Dawe, Sophocles. Oedipus Rex (Cambridge 1982) 4-5.
' The view that Oedipus is guilty is expressed by P. H. VeUacott, "The Guilt of
Oedipus," GJiR 11 (1964) 137-48, and A. Cameron, The Identity of Oedipus the King (New
York 1968) 133.
^° See W. B. Stanford, Greek Tragedy and the Emotions (London 1983), who dtes
bibliography at 174-76, to which add M. M. Kokolakis, "Greek Drama: the Stirring of
Pity," in J. H. Betts et aL (edd.). Studies in Honour ofT. B. L. Webster I (Bristol 1986)
170-78, and M. Heath, The Poetics of Greek Tragedy (London 1987) 5-36.
" L Golden, "The Qarification Theory of Katharsis." Hermes 104 (1976) 437-52.
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flaw,*2 because not all tragic heroes suffer a hamartia, which is in any case
more hkely an ignorance of fact than a moral flaw,^^ and because actions and
not character-traits cause things to happen in Greek tragedy. ^^
Oedipus does only one thing on stage: He "pursue[s] the truth at
whatever personal cost," and "accept[s] and endure[s] it when found."^^ This
is shown by the moment (1170) when he pauses in his course of action,
having realized its implications, and chooses to follow Delphi's command
and implicate himself by pursuing the truth. This moment recalls that in
Aeschylus* Libation Bearers (899-903) where Orestes pauses briefly and
then immediately chooses to follow Delphi's command and kill his mother.
But this very self-prosecution points backward in condemnation to an earlier
act, namely Oedipus' murder of his father Laius.
The murder of Laius might justify part of Oedipus' suffering, since it is
a deed and not a character-flaw and since it not only precedes but also paves
the way for his suffering.^^ Laius' death makes Jocasta a widow, and so
enables Oedipus to marry her^^ and reside in Thebes; the residence of the
regicide in Thebes, in turn, causes the plague (106-07) that sets in motion
the plot Still, small causes can provoke disproportionately large effects and
our question remains.
The crime of parricide has two components: homicide and father-abuse.
The play enforces this distinction: The quests for Laius' killer and for
Oedipus' father remain separate for most of it, not merging until the
recognition-scene (1182-85). Let us examine the crime under these two
headings, beginning by considering the murder of Laius in the context of
fifth-century Athenian law. This is relevant, given Greek tragedy's tendency
to anachronism,^^ the audience's familiarity with the Athenian judici^
" Dodds 38-39 = 66.
^^ On this question, see especially J. M. Bremer. Hamartia (Amsterdam 1969). T. C. W.
Snnton, "Hamartia in AristoUe and Greek Tragedy," CQ 25 (1975) 221-54 = Collected
Papers on Greek Tragedy (Oxford 1990) 143-85. and S. Halliwell. Aristotle's Poetics
(London 1986) 202-37.
^* On the general preference for plot over character, see S. Goldhill. "Character and
Action. Represenution and Reading: Greek Tragedy and its Critics." in C. Felling (ed.).
Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature (Oxford 1990) 100-27. who cites
bibliography at 111 n. 32. On character in Sophocles, see P. E. Easleiiing. "Character in
Sophocles." G&R 24 (1977) 121-29.
" Dodds 48 = 76.
" Dodds 39 = 66.
^'' There are no grounds on which to assess Oedipus' guilt or innocence in the case of
his incest, for incest was not formally illegal at Athens; see A. R. W. Harrison. The Law cf
Athens I: The FamUy and Property (Oxford 1968) 22 n. 3. and M. Broadbent. Studies in
Greek Genealogy (Leiden 1968) 155. This is of little moment, since incest is obviously a
violation of motherhood, which the Greeks held in high esteem (see A. H. Sonunerstein,
Aeschylus. Eumenides [Cambridge 1989] ad 657-66) and apparently constituted •
pollution (R. Paricer. Miasma [Oxford 1983] 97-98).
i» B. M. W. Knox. The Heroic Temper (Berkeley 1964) 58-59. P. E. Eastcrling.
"Anachionism in Greek Tragedy." JHS 105 (1985) 1-10.
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apparatus and the probability that the play draws heavily for its structure on
the process of judicial inquiry.*'
Classical Athenian jurisprudence recognizes three kinds of killing^" and
different scholars have classified Laius' murder under all three. The first is
the unintentional killing of an innocent victim (what we would call
"manslaughter"). The hero of Oedipus at Colonus claims unintentionality
to defend himself from the charge of parricide (273, 547^8, 988-99). Yet
if Oedipus did not know that Laius was his father, he knew that he was a
human being and that his act was homicide, in contrast to Deianira who
could (but, interestingly, does not) plead unintentional killing, having
administered a poison believing it to be a love-potion.
The second kind is justified homicide (which has no equivalent in
American jurisprudence), which is the intentional killing of a criminal
caught in the act. The best-known example is the killing of an adulterer
apprehended in flagrante delicto}^ but another is the killing of a
highwayman caught red-handed.^^ Oedipus does not claim to have thought
that Laius was a robber.^^ Indeed, according to the admittedly none-too-
factual report of Laius' surviving slave, Laius and company suspected
Oedipus of intending to rob them (122), as he does in Euripides' version.^^
The third kind is intentional homicide (ordinary murder). Self-defense^
was a mitigating circumstance in a case of intentional homicide, rather than
grounds for lawful homicide.^^ Demosthenes (21. 71-75) tells how a
certain Euaeon, who killed a man in retaliation for a single blow, was
convicted by one vote. This case shows that, despite the considerable
sympathy that the jury obviously felt for the killer, "the mere fact that the
victim struck the first blow was not sufficient to acquit the killer.''^"^ One
must show that the victim intended to kill the murderer. Yet Oedipus does
not argue self-defense,^* claiming, as he would have to do, that Laius was
^' R. Gamer. Law and Society in Classical Athens (London 1987) 103-04. and R. G.
Lewis. "The Procedural Basis of Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus," GRBS 30 (1989) 41-66;
cf. G. Greiifenhagen."Der Prozess des Odipus." Hermes 94 (1966) 147-76.
^ See D. M. MacDowell. The Law in Classical Athens (London 1978) 113-18.
^* I.e. en" aiixocptopq), e.g. Lys. 1.
^2
'Ev 66u Ka0eA,a)v. Dem. 23. 53; cf. Aeschin. 1. 91.
^ M. Gagarin, "Self-Defense in Athenian Homicide Law." GRBS 19 (1978) 111-20. at
118 n. 32, pace Wilamowitz (above, note 7) 55 = 209.
^ Eur. Phoen. 44-45. Even in Euripides' version the robbery is incidental to the
murder and is not the motive for it.
^^
'Anvvonevoq dpxovxa xeip'iJv a5{Kcov. Lys. 4. 11. Dem. 23. 50. 47. 7, Isoc. 20.
1. PI. Ug. 869d. Arist. Rhel. 2. 24. 9 (= 1402a). ApoUod. Bibl. 2. 4. 9.
^ Gagarin (above, note 23) passim.
^ Gagarin (above, note 23) 117.
^ As is claimed by Wilamowitz (above, note 7) 55 = 209, J. T. Sheppard, The Oedipus
Tyrannus of Sophocles (Cambridge 1920) xxix, and C. M. Bowra. Sophoclean Tragedy
(Oxford 1944) 165.
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about to kill him,^^ stating in fact that on this occasion^^ Laius wanted only
to drive him from the road (805). Moreover, according to Plato (Leg.
869b)—who may or may not be reflecting Attic law
—
parent-murder is the
only crime in which self-defense is not an extenuating circumstance.
One might suppose that Oedipus' act was a third-degree murder, since
he acted without malice aforethought (807) .^^ and that he was guilty of
something less than premeditated homicide, but this claim would ignore
fifth-century Attic law, which reserves no special category for homicide that
is intentional but unpremeditated. '*[T]he Athenians used [the terms]
'unpremeditated' and 'unintentional' interchangeably
. . . [T]he practical
effect of this was to narrow unintentional homicides to our category of
accidental killings. This meant that all other killings were classified as
intentional and were subject to the severest penalties. Sudden killings thus
received no more lenient treatment than any other intentional killings unless
some justification such as self-defence could be shown"^^ (which in
Oedipus' case, as we have seen, it could not).
Again, one might argue that, whatever the judgement of a hypothetical
fifth-century court, the heroic society in which Oedipus is imagined as
having lived would have "acquitted" him. Not so. In Homer and Hesiod a
murderer faces one of three penalties. He may either be killed by the
victim's family ,^^ or go into exile,^ or offer monetary compensation. ^^
Only two of the murders mentioned in epic are not followed by such an
atonement: One is the murder of Laius; the other is Heracles' murder of
Iphitus.3^ When Sophocles recounts the latter (Track. 38, 270-79) he
supplies the penalty, exile, that is missing in Homer's account. Given
Sophocles' supplement to this story, Oedipus stands alone among epic
murderers^^ in escaping human retribution. We do not know why this is so
^' Not even in the OC does he make this claim explicilly, although he says naScbv (lev
otvTe8p(ov (271), which implies reciprocity. Mekler's emendation (accepted by Jebb) at
547, Kai Yctp av, ovq ecpoveuo' ep." dntoXeoav, has Laius intent on murder, but the MSS
read Kai ydp aXXouq ecpove-uoa KanwXtaa, which is capable of a wide variety of
reconstructions, of which Mekler's is by no means the most obvious.
^° For Laius had, of course, wanted to kill him when he exposed him years before, a
point to which we shall return.
^' Ai' opYTiq. This is but the last occurrence of opyfi and related words in the play, the
others being at 335. 337, 339, 344, 345. 364. 405 and 524.
^^ W. T. Loomis, "The Nature of Premeditation in Athenian Homicide Law." JHS 92
(1972) 86-95, at 93.
"Orf. 1. 35-43. 3. 309-10. 11. 422-30.
''*//. 2. 661-70. 13. 694-97. 15. 431-39. 16. 572-76, 23. 85-90. 24. 480-83. Od.
13. 259-75. 14. 380-81, 15. 271-82. [Hes.] Aspis 9-19, 80-85. Hes. fr. 257
Merkelbach-West.
"noivfi://. 9. 633, 18. 497-508.
36 Laius: Od. 11. 271-80; Iphitus: Od. 21. 24-30.
3^ There are other murderers known to Greek myth as we find it in Apollodorus who
make no compensation or purification for murder and these are listed by Parker (above,
note 17) 375. sections 2 and 3.
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in the epics, but Sophocles supplies an explanation: The Thebans were too
distracted by the Sphinx to investigate the murder and try the killer (130-
31). Although postponed by the Sphinx, punishment was as fitting for
Laius' killer as for any other. This is why the oracle orders the murderer's
exile (98) and why Oedipus pronounces this sentence upon him (236-^3).
The audience's appreciation of Oedipus' act was conditioned by the
precepts of ancient Greek popular morality .^^ For example, Laius' murder
occurred at a crossroads (716, 730, 733, 800-01), an important fact since it
is a constant in the myth, while the precise location is variable.^' The
crossroads is a place where a decision must be made, as in the story of the
choice of Heracles."*^ As in that story, the alternatives confronting Oedipus
were as much moral as directional: By turning one way, he would kill four
strangers; either by retreating (an option available to Oedipus, but not to
Heracles) or by deviating temporarily from his chosen path, he would spare
them.
Three considerations make clear the judgement that morality passes
upon these alternatives. Firstly, since Laius was trying to push Oedipus
from the road (804-05), which was narrow (1399), and since there was
another path available, one party should step aside. According to Homer (//.
9. 69, 160-61), one should yield to the kinglier, that is, to him who
commands more men,'*^ and to the elder. The old might defer to the young
of higher rank, but with both age and rank^^ on his side one would expect
deference and try to exact it if not forthcoming. Laius (a king) is actually
kinglier than Oedipus (a king's son) and obviously so, travelling in a mule-
car (753, 803)"*^ with a retinue, while Oedipus goes alone on foot.''^ In the
^^ I shall henceforth use the term "morality" as a shorthand for "ancient Greek popular
morality."
^' Cf. Aesch. fr. 387a Radt. On this fragment, see G. O. Hutchinson, Aeschylus.
Septem Contra Thebas (Oxford 1985) xix-xx. The crossroads (of unspecified location) are
mentioned again in Sen. Oed. 278, 772.
*°Pind. Pylh. 11. 38. Theogn. 911-12. Prodicus apud Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 21-34 (= 84 B
2 Diels-Kranz). Hdl. 1. 11. 2, PI. Leg. 799c. Beyond its empirical demonslrabihty. recent
readers of the play are reminded of this fact by the commentary of Dawe (above, note 8) 3. a
scholar scarcely given to rash interpretative conjecture. See. too. S. Halliwell. "Where
Three Roads Meet: A Neglected Detail in the Oedipus Tyrannus," JHS 106 (1986) 187-90.
at 189.
*' Agamemnon, of whom the word PaoiXeuxepoq is used in comparison with Achilles,
commands one hundred ships to Achilles' fifty (//. 2. 576. 685). See R. Drews. Basileus
(New Haven 1983). A. G. Geddes, "Who's Who in 'Homeric' Society?," CQ 34 (1984) 17-
36. esp. 28-36, and T. Rihill, "Kings and Commoners in Homeric Society," LCM 11
(1986) 89-91.
'»2 E.g. Od. 2. 14. Tyrt. fr. 12. 37 West, Theogn. 935-36.
^^ In addition to its usefulness for cartage, an dmfivTi is the appropriate vehicle for
conveyance on a ceremonial occasion; see H. L. Lorimer. "The Country Cart of Ancient
Greece." JHS 23 (1903) 132-51. esp. 136-37. Nor is it merely the tool of nistics: A
ajia^a drawn by mules was not beneath Priam's dignity (//. 24. 266-74) and the djrf|vii
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parallel incident in the Iliad (1. 188-92), when Achilles is provoked by
Agamemnon, who is both kinglier and elder, he contemplates homicide,
revealing that the course actually chosen by Oedipus is not unnatural, but
then wisely abstains from violence. Laius was also clearly older than
Oedipus, for his hair was "a sable silver'd" (742) and Oedipus calls him
"elder" (805, 807), not necessarily an old man, but a senior figure'*^
deserving of respect. Oedipus should not have quarrelled with Laius, not
because he might be his father ."^^ but because morality demanded respect for
elders.^''
Secondly, Laius was a stranger (813), whom it is wrong to kill,'*^ for
"all strangers are in the keeping of Zeus" (Od. 6. 207-08 = 14. 57-58) in
his capacity as Zeus of Strangers."^^ Indeed, some may even be Zeus
incognito.^^ These beliefs are grounded in social reaUty: The stranger lacks
brotherhood, law and hearth (//. 9. 63) and is very vulnerable. To hmit this
vubierability and prevent a breakdown of society, the Greeks ritualized the
behaviour proper toward strangers. When a stranger presents himself at
one's house, he must be entertained no matter how inconvenient (cf. Eur.
Ale. 476 ff.). Even in battle one should not attack a man of unknown
identity lest he be a god.^^ The proper behaviour of strangers meeting as
wayfarers is shown in the Iliad, where Priam, the old man, travelling away
from home with his herald encounters the unrecognized young man, his
surrogate son, who is Hermes in disguise, and whom he suspects of being a
brigand.^^ In contrast to Oedipus, Hermes is a paragon of courtesy .^^ To
was used as a vehicle for competition in the Olympic games (cf. Pind. 01. 5, 6). Contrast
the Near Eastern attitude to the mule as shown by Zechariah 9. 9 and Matthew 21. 5.
** The king has naturally undertaken a mission to Delphi himself, rather than
delegating it; cf. Pind. 01. 6. 37-38. No motive for the mission is given or necessary in
the play.
*^ Dawe (above, note 8) ad 805.
*^ As Vellacott (above, note 9) 140 argues.
*''
E.g. Ar. Nub. 993, PI. Resp. 412c, 465a, Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 10.
** See J. Gould, "Hiketeia," JHS 93 (1973) 74-103. at 90-94.
'*''//. 13. 624-25, Od. 9. 270-71. 14. 283-84. W. Burkerl, Greek Religion, trans. J.
Raffan (Cambridge. MA 1985) 130.
5°0d. 17. 483-87. Ov. Met. 1. 212-13. 8. 611-724; cf. Acts 14. 12. A. S. Hollis,
Ovid. Metamorphoses Book VIII (Oxford 1970) 108-09 and Callimachus. Hecale (Oxford
1990) 341-54.
^^ //. 6. 119-236. This is a special case, since Glaucus and Diomedes are connected by
earlier ties of family; but then so too were Oedipus and Laius. if they had only bothered to
stop and find this out.
"Old man: ^epcov //. 24. 358. 361. 368. like the npia^vq Laius. OT 805. 807;
travelling away from home: //. 24. 481; herald: //. 24. 282. 352. again like Laius. OT 753;
young man: Koupoq //. 24. 347; son: //. 24. 362. 371 with C. W. MacLeod's note (Homer.
Iliad XXIV [Cambridge 1982] ad 362. "Hermes becomes something like Hector to Priam,
both as his defender and as his good 'son'"); cf. Oedipus' unrecognized filiation; brigand:
//. 24. 355-57, like Oedipus, OT 122.
^^ The particular relevance of this story to my argument was pointed out to me by
Emmet Robbins.
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murder strangers is extreme barbarity, fit for Laestrygonians or Cyclopes,
each of whom is a law to himself and cares nothing for others (Od. 9. 1 12-
15), but unthinkable to a civilized Greek. Of j)otentially ironic application
to Oedipus is Hesiod's observation (Op. 327-32) that whoever harms a
stranger is as bad as a father-abuser.
Thirdly, Laius was accompanied by a herald (753), recognizable as such
(802), presumably through his caduceus.^'* The herald accompanied him
because he was an "envoy sent to consult the oracle"^^ (114) on official
religious and state business. Oedipus at first "[forebore] to strike the sacred
herald"^^—whom he does eventually kill—because heralds are inviolable.^''
To violate their rights was "sacrilegious";^^ to kill them was to break the
customs of all men.^' Herodotus (7. 133-37) tells how the Spartans killed
Dareius' heralds and were incited by the hero Talthybius, in life the herald of
Agamemnon, to send men to Xerxes to die to expiate the crime. Xerxes
refused to act illegally like the Spartans; yet, although he spared them, their
sons later died, Herodotus editorializes, in requital for Talthybius' wrath.
Once, whenever Athenian youths assembled they wore mourning for the
herald Copreus whom the Athenians had killed (Philostr. VS2. 1. 5 = 2. 59
Kayser). An Athenian herald murdered by the Megarians was buried with
full honours at the Dipylon gate while his murder caused enmity between
the two states.^
Three arguments, all inadequate, might be raised in Oedipus' favour.
The first is that he did not choose to kill Laius because, unlike
Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigeneia (Aesch. Ag. 206-17), his deliberation
is not reported. Lacking on his lips is "the characteristic cry of the tragic
hero,"^' "What should I do?"^^ Yet this is a feature of his character, not of
his situation. The only one to hesitate in our play is Creon (91-92, 1443);
^ So R. C. Jebb. Sophocles. Oedipus Tyrannus^ (Cambridge 1887) ad 804-12.
55 See C. P. Bill, "Notes on the Greek eetopoi; and eecopia," TAPA 32 (1901) 196-
204.
"Jebb (above, note 54) ad 804-12.
5' See L. M. Weiy, "Le meurtre des herauts de Darius en 491 et I'inviolabilite du heraut,"
AC 35 (1966) 468-86. The relevance of this evidence to the case of Oedipus has been
noted by A. D. Filton Brown in a review of W.-H. Friedrich, Vorbild und Neugeslaltung, CR
19 (1969) 307-09. at 308.
5*
'Aoepeq, Dem. 12. 4.
5^ Hdl. 7. 136. 2. A Euripidean chorus cries \ii\ npoc, Gecov icfipvKa xoX\ii\(r[\(;
Geveiv. //erac/. 271.
^°Piut. Per. 30. 3. Dem. 12. 4. Oedipus, who killed a man engaged in a theoria, will
easily insult a seer (386-89; cf. his insulting of the Pythia. 964-65). since that is a
relatively common form of disrespect for the gods* servants (cf. //. 1. 106. 12. 231-50,
Soph. Ant. 1033-38).
^> A. F. Garvie. Aeschylus. Choephori (Oxford 1986) ad 899.
" T{ 5pdoco; Aesch. Cho. 899. Soph. Phil. 908. Eur. Ale. 380; cf. Aesch. Suppl. 379-
80. Ag. 206-07. Soph. Aj. 457. Hdt. 1. 11. 3^. Eur. Med. 502. Ar. Vesp. 319a
(paratragic). See further R. L. Fowler. "The Rhetoric of Desperation." HSCP 91 (1987) 5-
38.
R. Drew Griffith 201
Oedipus is full of Sophoclean self-assurance, impatient at others' slowness
(74, 287, 1162) and always quick to jump to a suspicion (124-25, 139^0,
380-89). More quick-witted than Agamemnon, he will not laboriously
deliberate before choosing the wrong course; it is his particular glory to rush
"with characteristic decisiveness"^^ into actions whose outcome is ruinous.
Secondly, Oedipus was provoked. Laius was rude to him and seems by
nature to share his temperament as well as his looks (743), as we would
expect of kings, who laid great store by heredity.^'* Morality, far from
counselling one to turn the other cheek, commands vengeance: Helping
friends and harming enemies is the oft-cited recipe for justice.^^ StUl, the
vengeance exacted by Oedipus exceeds the wrong done. Oedipus says,
"[Laius] paid no equal penalty" (810),^^ a phrase reminiscent of the herald in
Aeschylus' Agamemnon (532-33), who says that the Trojans "do not boast
that they wrought more than they suffered." This reminiscence is ominous
in view of the consequences that Agamemnon's excessive vengeance had for
him. Of course, in all self-defense killings the victim gets more than he
gave,^^ but this is only because he is less successful; in terms of intent the
acts are equal, with one killing in order to avoid being killed. Yet by
Oedipus' own admission Laius only sought to remove him from the road
(804-05). On this point again mordity suggests that the vengeance should
fit the offense, being equal to instead of greater than the crime,^^ a principle
enunciated by Antigone (Soph. Ant. 927-28). If equality of retribution was
not an absolute standard of moraUty, the Greeks were at least sensitive to
the problems inherent in excessive retaliation (cf. Soph. fir. 589 Radt). This
is clear in the present passage where the escalating violence spirals rapidly
out of control: Laius and his servant drive Oedipus away, perhaps using
only words (804-05); Oedipus responds with a blow, evidendy of his fist
(806-07); Laius is then the first to use a weapon, coming down upon
Oedipus' head with an ox-goad (807-09); Oedipus finally kills them all with
a deadUer weapon, his staff (811-13).
Why, then, mention the provocation at all? (It is not in earlier or later
accounts.^^) The reason is that neither here nor anywhere else did Sophocles
*3 Bowra (above, note 28) 190.
^ Cf. Neoplolemus in Soph. Phil., who shares the nature of the father he has never
known.
^^ E.g. Ant. 641-44. M. W. Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies
(Cambridge 1989) 26-59.
^^ Oil ^flv I'crnv y' exEioev. Thus Bowra (above, note 28) 164 is wrong to say, "Laius
was the aggressor and got what he deserved"; by Oedipus' own admission he got more than
he deserved.
^"^ Gagarin (above, note 23) 118 n. 32.
**
"loa npbc, I'oa. Hdt. 1. 2. 1.
^' Earlier accounts: Od. 11. 273. Find. 01. 2. 38-39; later accounts: cf. Eur. Phoen. 37-
44. in which Oedipus is provoked, but not by Laius.
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portray an irredeemably evil man. Faced with a dilemma, he chooses a
crime that he would never have gone out of his way to commit
Thirdly, it will be argued that no one censures Oedipus for murder as
murder (as distinct from regicide and parricide). On a strict application of
the principle that what is not mentioned in the play does not exist (schol. //.
5. 385d), such censure must be impossible. The answer to this lies in the
play's structure. The rapid movement of the play between two distinct
questions, the public one of who killed Laius (106-07) and the private
worry of Oedipus over his parents* identity (437, 779-93, 1017), allows no
time for the identity of Oedipus' victims to be raised in its own right If a
third question arises at all it is the red herring of wheth^ one can foreknow
the future (720-22, 945-49, 981-82). Oedipus reveals to Jocasta and the
audience his past apparently for the first time,''® only when the play is half
over (813), and in the context of the distracting search for Laius* killer.
If Oedipus chose to kill the old man and his act was no mere accident or
reflex, what was his motive? None is explicit in the text which gives an
account remarkable for its succinctness (813); we must infer one from
Oedipus' character.''! Oedipus, exemplary in so many respects, is led to his
crime because he has the Sophoclean hero's impulsive incapacity to yield,''^
as when he ignores the pleas of his wife and herdsman to stop his
investigation (1060-61, 1165).^^ Read this trait as hubris^^ or heroism; it
keeps him from yielding to the old man and thence leads him to murder.
"Character is destiny."^^
If Oedipus is unquestionably guilty of murder, we must turn to the
question of whether he is guilty of the other component of parricide,
harming his father. Oedipus does harm his father and this was a grave
offense,''^ but he never would have done so knowingly, having taken
elaborate, if futile, steps to avoid it Therefore, he could'" defend himself by
saying that he did not know that Laius was his father. One can act in
ignorance and still bear some blame according to Pittacus of Mytilene. He
enacted a law that one be fined double for an offense committed while
""^ This teems to be the implication of 771-73 and of the phrase Kai aoi, yvvoi,
tdXtieeq e^epS (800).
^^ E)odds 3&-41 = 66-68 ridicules the scrutiny of character, but I would argue that much
of this scrutiny has been rather insufficiently focused than misdirected.
''2 See Knox (above, note 18) 15-16.
"^^ He does yield once in the play, with great reluctance, at 669-72, when he spares
Creon in response to the combined pleas of Jocasta and the chorus.
'* Some scholars such as Winninglon-Ingram (above, note 8) have tried to have an
Oedipus at once arrogant (183) and iimocent (203).
''^ HeracUtus 22 B 1 19 EKels-Kranz, quoted by Winnington-Ingram (above, note 8)
177.
"* Hes. Op. 331-32. Tlieogn. 821-22. Aesch. Hum. 269-71. Ar. Ran. 147-50.
^ As he does in Soph. OC 273. 547-48. 988-99.
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drunk.''* This law was not designed to discourage drunkenness,"'' or he
would have outlawed wine, but rather, as Aristotle approvingly explains,
because one is culpable of a crime committed in ignorance, if this ignorance
arises through negligence.*^ Oedipus* abuse of his father is an extraordinary
example of such a crime.
One would not have thought Oedipus negligent in harming his father.
Indeed, his abandoning of his comfortable life in Corinth to embark upon
the wandering that brought him to Thebes seems the opposite of negligence.
Nevertheless, Oedipus was negligent in remaining ignorant of his father's
identity, having been led into this negligence again by his impulsive
character. He made the trek to Delphi to learn who his parents were and
upon hearing that he was destined to defile them, he immediately abandoned
the object of his journey, for the oracle manifestly did not resolve it (788-
89), raising instead the separate (789) issue of parricide and incest, and set
off to flee Corinth. Far firom distracting him from his parents' identity as it
did,*^ the oracle's response made it imperative that he pursue just this quest
As a distant second best, he might have contemplated a life of non-violence
and celibacy*^ rather than murdering the first people whom he met and
marrying in the first city to which he came. The failure to consult the
oracle further is an essential ingredient in his downfall and shifts the blame
onto his own shoulders, as is shown by Sophocles' friend (cf. Soph. fir. 5
West lEG) Herodotus.*^ Herodotus tells how Croesus, having received the
oracle that if he attacked Persia, he would destroy a mighty empire, caused
his own misfortune by attacking without first determining which empire
was meant (Hdt 1. 91. 4). Delphi addressed a similar rebuke in like
circumstances to the children of Heracles (290 Parke-Wormell = L63
Fontenrose). While repeated consultation of an oracle might seem an
improbable pestering of the god, myth records many examples of just this
phenomenon.*^ Like that of Croesus and the Heraclids, Oedipus' ignorance
results from his negligence in failing either to understand Apollo's warning
or to inquire further about a question that the oracle had just shown to be
crucial. In this regard, Creon is an important foil, showing constant
reliance upon Delphi (603, 1442-43).
'« Diog. Ueit. 1. 76. Ar. Pol. 2. 9. 9 (= 1274b), Rhet. 2. 25. 7 (= 1402b).
*" Pace Diog. Lacrt.
«o Ar dtjiaeiav. ArisL Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 8-9 (= 1113b-14a).
'^ He acu as though he knew that Polybus and Merope were undoubtedly his parenU; cf.
826-27.
*^ Which can <xly with extreme latitude be characterized as "compilting] a handlist of
all the things he must not do" (Dodds 40 = 68, quoting Waldock); it would be a short lisL
'^ Sophocles and Herodotus shared views on many topics: e.g. Ant. 908-12 - HdL 3.
119. 6; El. 417-23 - Hdt. 1. 108. 1; OC 337-41 - HdL 2, 35. 2; OT 1528-30 « Hdt 1. 32.
5; El. 62r^ - Hdt. 4. 95; OC 1224-27 - HdL 7. 46. 3^.
**4-5. 43-44, 94-95, 161, 216-21 Parke-Wormell = Q58A-B, Q28-29, Q146-47,
Q191A-B, Q7-9 Fontenrose.
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There are signs that Oedipus has not been told the truth: the scars on
his feet that have always troubled him (1033) and the story of the drunk
(780), which may have been widely circulated,*^ and which Polybus and
Merope do not deny outright (783-84). Oedipus, skilled at reading signs,
has to his credit noted these and feels the uncertainty of his parentage as an
impairment of his intellect (786); it motivates his hundred-kilometre walk
on mountain roads from CorinUi to Delphi and repeatedly rears its head
during his quest for the regicide (437, 779-93, 1017). He elevates his
ignorance into his governing principle, acknowledging that he is "the
Know-Nothing Oedipus" (397).
This man, who knows of his ignorance, acts not once but repeatedly as
though he were privy even to hidden facts, treating the many phantasms of
his imagination (124-25, 139-40, 380-89) as though they were manifest
revelations (534-35). Likewise at the crossroads he acted—knowingly and
yet as though unknowingly—in ignorance, recklessly failing to yield when
it was moral and convenient to do so.
In light of these observations, we see that Oedipus is guilty of parricide
as well as being an innocent victim of incest But there is still one point to
make in his favour, namely that his fate was unconditionally pre-ordained.*^
"Sophocles,** writes Dodds, "has provided a conclusive answer to those who
suggest that Oedipus could, and therefore should, have avoided his fate. The
oracle was unconditional . . . And what an oracle predicts is bound to
happen.**"
While a conditional prediction allows for the play of free will, an
unconditional prediction might be supposed to imply predestination. Even
on this assumption the prediction does not exonerate Oedipus, for
predestination does not, paradoxically, constitute a compulsion. Dodds
knows this. His own book. The Greeks and the Irrational, made familiar the
concept of overdetermination whereby according to early Greek thought an
event may be "doubly determined, on the natural and on the supernatural
plane.**** We cannot deny this overdetermined status to Oedipus* act: He
killed Laius by free choice, thereby abdicating any claim to essential moral
innocence. Oedipus' act is also determined on the supernatural plane by
fate, and the Pythia says so (713),*' but fate is an impersonal force, not an
^ Dqjending upon the inteipretadon of the phrase ixpeipne ^ap noXw (786).
" 148, 149 Parke-Wonnell = L17. L18 Fonlenrosc. Wilamowitz (above, note 7) 55 =
209. Dodds 41 = 69.
" Dodds 41 = 69 (Dodds* itaUcs).
'" The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley 1951) 31. In the present context he cites,
after B. M. W. Knox. Oedipus at Thebes (New Haven 1957) 39, the case of Peter, who
fulfilled Jesus' prediction that he would deny him (Matthew 26. 34. 74-75) but "did so by
an act of free choice" (Dodds 43 = 71). H. D. F. Kitto. Sophocles: Dramatist and
Philosopher (London 1958) 60 is right in saying, "there was nothing compulsoiy about
the affair at the cross-roads."
" Cf. [Laius*] |i6pip.oq wio?. Pmd. 01. 2. 38.
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Olympian deity or even a lackey of the gods like the Furies, and it is as
binding upon gods as upon mortals (cf. //. 16. 433-61).
Oedipus' unsuccessful attempt to elude his fate has been attributed to
hubris,'° but he would have invited greater condemnation either by rushing
toward Corinth in homicidal and libidinous determination to fulfil the
prophecy or by quietly going about his business like some Stoic avant la
lettre. Moreover, Socrates is not hubristic in trying to disprove Delphi's
claim that he is the wisest of men,'^ a less than total faith in the
ineluctability of the Pythia's predictions being neither unusual at Athens
nor in itself evidence of impiety.
Even j^art firom overdetermination, Oedipus' fate does not absolve him
of blame, since he could have fulfilled it in total innocence. Laius could
have "died at the hand of his son" (713) and Oedipus become the "murderer"
(793) of his father had he killed him accidentally, for example while hunting
or playing javelin or discus (cf. e.g. Hdt. 1. 43, Apollod. Bibl. 1. 3. 3).
One who kills by accident is readily called a "murderer" by a society that
denies this name and the consequent legal proceedings neither to animals nor
even to inanimate objects (Arist. Ath. Pol. 57. 4).
Furthermore, an unconditional prediction is not evidence for
predestination if time for the agent making the prediction is not an abstract,
inexorable forward flow. Consider this example: Suppose I videotape a
group of playing children and, before playing back the tape, I state that
during the play-session Mary will steal Tom's teddy-bear. My prediction is
unconditional and will be brought to pass, and yet I did not compel Mary to
act in this way; I may even wish that she had not done so (it has spoiled my
movie). I am, in fact, incapable of imposing my will on the children or of
removing theirs from them, but I can accurately predict how they will act,
because I, unlike them, do not experience time as a chronometric,
impersonal medium. If Apollo has a relationship to time like that in this
example, he could accurately predict events without ordaining them and he
could have such a relationship to time only if Time itself is a free agent,
moving forward or backward, quickly or slowly, for the benefit of those
whom he would help. According to the Greek conception, such was in fact
the nature of Time.'^ In our play. Time is personified as "the All-seer"
(1213).'^ The situation in the play is more complex than in the videotape
^ J. B. Halsted. "Oedipus, in Oedipus the King, ConaoM Many Serious Errors," CB 55
(1979) 73-77, at 77.
'1 PL Ap. 21a-b (420 Parke-WonneU = H3 Fontenrose).
'2 J. de Romilly, Time in Greek Tragedy (Ithaca 1968) 50 writes, "Even if things are
supposed to exist through all eternity and to have been decided regardless of time, it is with
time and in time that they come to be. He uncovers them." See also P. Vivante, "On Time
in Pindar," Arelhusa 5 (1972) 107-31, who cites bibliography at 130-31, to which add A.
M. Komicka, "La notion du temps chez Pindarc," Eos 64 (1976) 5-15.
'3 llus is a tiUe of Zeus (Aesch. Eum. 1045. Soph. OC 1085) and of HeUos (Aescfa. PV
91; cf. //. 3. 277).
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example, because Apollo does not predict the event to a disinterested third
party but to the protagonist himself, and Oedipus reacts of his own free will
to the god's prediction. Yet such is the nature of fate that any action that
Oedipus might have taken in response to any prediction that Apollo might
have made would have ended in the same result, albeit brought about by a
different chain of intermediary events.
To sum up: By murdering the belligerent stranger, his superior and
elder along with his retinue, including the sacred herald, while they were
engaged upon official religious and state business, Oedipus violated the
prerogatives of Zeus of Strangers, the respect due to superiors and elders, and
the principle of fitting retaliation; he is therefore guilty of murder. He knew
that he was acting in ignorance and yet behaved as though he did not know
this; he is therefore guilty of father-abuse. He was fated to commit his
crime, but it cannot be shown that he was compelled to do so, and certainly
not in the way in which he did.
What, then, of Apollo, who manifests himself in the story of Oedipus
(1329)? If Oedipus had been, as the prevailing view holds, essentially
morally innocent, then Apollo would have been unjust in allowing him to
suffer as he does. Now that we have found Oedipus in fact responsible in
some measure for some of the suffering that he incurs, the possibility arises
that Apollo's actions may be just There is no a priori reason to think that
they are so; the gods of Greek myth lie, commit adultery, are gluttons.
"Men find some things unjust, other things just; but in the eyes of God all
things are beautiful and good and jusL"^"* Nevertheless, if the actions of
Sophocles' Apollo conform to an accepted definition of justice, we should
admit that he at least is in that sense a just god.
We have seen that he did not compel Oedipus to kill his father and sleep
with his mother, but neither did he try to prevent him from doing so, for
example by giving him a straightforward answer to his question concerning
his parents. The reason that he did not do so is linked, perhaps, to the
fundamental difference of power between god and man. Gods cannot reveal
themselves undisguised to men without destroying them;'^ when they
appear incognito they are often recognized only at the end of the encounter
and only by the extremity of their body, their feet (//. 13. 71-72, Verg.
Aen. 1. 405, etc.). This disguise-principle is intensified in connection with
verbal communication. Gods have their own language and their own special
** Heraclitus 22 B 102 Diels-Kranz. quoted by Dodds 47 = 76.
93 Zeus and Semele: Find. 01. 2. 25-26. Eur. Bacch. 6-12; Yahweh and Moses: Exodus
33. 18-23.
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intonation> The inevitable process of translation needed to enable them to
communicate with men is complex: At Delphi when "the enquirer entered,
the Pythia was already under the influence of Apollo, and was in some
abnormal state of trance or ecstasy . . . [Her] answer would vary in its
degree of coherence and intelligibility. When it had been given, the prophet
would reduce it to some form, and dictate it to the enquirer.*'^'' The answer
given by this convoluted process was perforce oblique: "The lord whose
oracle is in Delphi neither speaks nor hides, but gives a sign" (Heraclitus 22
B 93 Diels-Kranz). It is scarcely surprising if the answer was not as
straightforward as we would like.
Even so, Apollo does not lie to Oedipus. The cause of Oedipus'
extraordinary ignorance of the events attendant upon his birth lies with
Polybus and Merope. The drunk at the banquet accused Oedipus of being a
supposititious child (780), but this is itself either a lie or an error, for
Polybus was privy to the secret (1021). Even at the drunk's false charge the
royal couple expresses anger, thereby effectively misleading Oedipus (783-
84).^* Later, a quick detection of the regicide is prevented by the lone
survivor's mendacious description of "many robbers" (122-23).'^' In both
cases humans, not gods, have lied.
Whether we find any justice in Apollo's actions will depend upon our
definition of the term. Simonides' definition, cited by Polemarchus in
Plato's Republic, is "giving back to each person what is owing."i°° Sq
conceived, justice is wholly reactive. It requires one not to initiate any
action, but only to respond in kind to the actions of others. It does not
require one to help any person (by warning of impending disaster or by any
other means) unless one has been helped first by him. True to the Greeks'
anthropomorphic conception of the gods, this rule applies to human-god
relationships just as to relationships between humans. In the Iliad, Apollo
helps Chryses because he has roofed many temples for him (//. 1. 39). In
•* For their own language, see Hes. Theog. 831, for their own intonation, see LSJ s.v.
oooa and 6)1(]>t). See also C. Watkins, "Language c^ Gods and Language of Men: Remaiks
on Some Indo-European Metalinguistic Traditions," in J. Puhvel (ed.). Myth and Law
among the Indo-Europeans (Berkeley 1970) 1-17, who cites bibliography at 1 nn. 1 and 2,
to which add J. Clay, "The Planktai and Moly: Divine Naming and Knowing in Homer,"
Hermes 100 (1972) 127-31, J. Qay, "Demas and Aude: The Nature of Divine
Transformation in Homer." Hermes 102 (1974) 129-36, and J. Calder6n Felices, "Lengua
de los dioses—^lengua de los hombres," Faventia 4.1 (1982) 5-33.
" H. W. Paike and D. E. W. Wormell, The Delphic Oracle I: The History (Oxford 1956)
33.
'^ Nothing would have prevented Polybus and Merope from openly adopting a child,
but, as a foundling (1026), Oedipus cannot be adopted, if Athenian laws are imagined as
holding good in Corinth; hence they are forced to lie. See Harrison (above, note 17) 71.
" S. Goodhart, "A^jord^ TqnxoKe: Oedipus and Laius' Many Murderers," Diacritics 8
(1978) 55-71, esp. 56 n. 2.
10° To xa 6<peiX6ji£vo eKdaT<p dno5t56vai, PI. Resp. 33 le = Simonides 642 PMG.
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the Oresteia, the gods punish Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra in response to
their breaking of laws.
According to this conception of justice, Apollo is under no obligation
to help Oedipus by warning him of the impending catastrophe, for Oedipus
has performed no prior service for him. Yet, once Oedipus has offended the
gods by his sacrilegious behaviour at the crossroads, Apollo is obliged to
intervene and ensure that the fitting penalty of exile is enforced. He does
this through the plague and the oracle to Creon (97); we can also see him at
work in the fortuitous arrival of the Corinthian messenger (924) who, again
by a striking pseudo-coincidence, is the very man who rescued the infant
Oedipus in the first place (1022). Compassionate and comforting Apollo is
not, but he is just in this all-too-human sense.
At this point, a further objection might be raised. Given that, from
Oedipus' perspective, the murder of Laius is a crime justly punished by his
subsequent suffering, is not the same act, when viewed from the perspective
of Laius, merely an absurd suffering and, as such, evidence for the wanton
cruelty of the gods that negates any other hint of divine justice in the play?
When viewed from the perspective of Jocasta, does not the incestuous
marriage, discovery of which provoked her suicide, also refute any claims of
divine justice? I can meet this objection in two ways: First, Laius was not
a wholly innocent bystander at the time of his murder, having actually
provoked Oedipus to strike. Second, the suffering of Laius and Jocasta may
be construed as punishment for an earlier crime of their own: that in which
he "yoked" the feet of the infant Oedipus (718) and she gave the child to a
herdsman to kiU (1 173-74).ioi
Opinion is divided over whether newborns were commonly exposed in
fifth-century Athens. '^^ Even if they were, it would be rare to treat a
healthy, legitimate, first-bom son like Oedipus in this way.^^^ Exposure did
^°^ H. Lloyd-Jones. The Justice of Zeus^ (Berkeley 1983) 121 likewise believes that
Laius must deserve his suffering, yei his own solution (that the suffering is provoked by
Laius' rape of Chrysippus) violates Aristarchus' rule, "what is not mentioned in the play
does not exist," and so is less economical than the view proposed here.
^°^ A. Cameron, "The Exposure of Children and Greek Ethics," CR 46 (1932) 105-14
and W. V. Harris, "The Theoretical Possibility of Extensive Infanticide in the Graeco-
Roman World," CQ 32 (1982) 114-16 hold that exposure was common; M. Golden,
"Demography and the Exposure of Girls at Athens," Phoenix 35 (1981) 316-31 holds that
the exposure of girls was common; L. R. van Hook, "The Exposure of Infants at Athens,"
TAPA 51 (1920) 134-45, H. Bolkestein. "The Exposure of Children at Athens and the
eYXVipioTpiai," CP 17 (1922) 222-39, D. Engels, "The Problem of Female Infanticide in
the Greco-Roman World," CP 75 (1980) 112-20, and C. Patterson, "'Not Worth the
Rearing': The Causes of Infant Exposure in Ancient Greece," TAPA 115 (1985) 103-23,
are far more sceptical about the frequency of exposure of children of either sex.
'°^ Health: Patterson (previous note) 113-14; legitimacy: ibid. 115-16;
primogeniture: Cameron (previous note) 106 (cf. PI. Theat. 161c); maleness: Golden
(previous note) passim. Tyro in one of Sophocles* plays of that name exposed her twins
because they were illegitimate. It would of course be rare in real life, if not unparalleled in
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not constitute homicide, firstly because the newborn was not a legal person
until its adoption into the family during the naming festival, which took
place on about the tenth day of life^^ and an unwanted child would be
exposed before this time, Oedipus, for example, at three days (717-18), and
secondly because the parent did not actually kill the child. Yet, while not
criminal, the act was open to moral censure: Oedipus blames his parents
for hurting him knowingly, while he committed his crimes in ignorance
(Soph. OC 273, 547-48, 988-99); the servant saved him out of pity (1 178)
and Jocasta, thinking of the exposure, calls him "wretched" (855).^^^
Furthermore, Oedipus' was no ordinary exposure. Ordinary exposure is not
necessarily lethal, thrusting the newborn from the family only, not
necessarily from life. All children exposed in myth^^^ and, presumably,
many in real life were saved and reared as foundlings, ^^^ for the parents,
callous enough to abandon their child, scruple actually to shed its blood. By
contrast, Laius and Jocasta, intending actually to kill their son, left him on
a trackless mountain (719) where the hope of rescue was slight and took the
unprecedented step of maiming him, which both weakened him and made it
unlikely that he would be rescued even if found. We note the symmetrical
justice in the adult Oedipus' causing the deaths in fact of the parents who
tried to kill him as an infant.
m
Recognition that Oedipus' guilt and Apollo's justice are greater than is
usually allowed for affects how we understand what—if any—is Sophocles'
message. Sophocles' gods, like those of Aeschylus, are just in an obvious
human sense. It is no longer true, on the basis of this play at least, to
speak of "the incomprehensible ways of the divine will" or to hold that "one
must not bring in false concepts of human morality involving good and
gyjl"i08 These are precisely the concepts necessary to understand Apollo's
role in Oedipus' suffering. It is even less true to say that "what causes his
ruin is his own strength and coiu^age, his loyalty to Thebes, and his loyalty
legend (cf. Paris: Apollod. Bibl. 3. 12. 5), thai a child should be prophesied to kill his
father (Soph. 07 712-13).
'°'*N. J. Richardson, The Homeric Hymn to Demeter (Oxford 1974) 231-34 and
Patterson (above, note 102) 105-06.
'°5 Golden (above, note 102) 331; cf. PI. Theat. 161a.
'°^ On exposure as a motif in myth, see G. Murray, "Ritual Elements in the New
Comedy." CQ 37 (1943) 46-54 and D. B. Redford, "The Literary Motif of the Exposed
Child." Numen 14 (1967) 209-28.
^°^ epenxoi, Patterson (above, note 102) 121-22.
^°*
"Die unerforschlichen Wege des gotilichen Willens"; "man darf nicht durch gut and
bose falsche Begriffe menschlicher Sittlichkeit hineintragen," Wilamowitz (above, note
7) 56 = 210.
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to the truth."^°^ This is only "[t]he immediate cause"^^° of his ruin and the
Greeks are far more sensitive than we to ultimate causes, abounding as their
myths do in nativities, inventors, aetiologies and even an original sin or
two.^^* This is especially true in a legal context: For example, in Plato's
Apology (18a-b) Socrates identifies and refutes his "former accusers."
Oedipus is himself an aficionado of ultimate causes, beginning with
confident relish (132) the seemingly hopeless investigation into the regicide
and extrapolating from Teiresias' claim that he, Oedipus, has committed
parricide and incest not only an alleged proximate cause (Teiresias has been
bribed to say this) but also a putative distant cause (Creon bribed him
because he wants the kingship [380-89]). We must never forget the
ultimate cause of Oedipus' ruin—the murder at the crossroads come back
after all these years (613, 1213) to haunt him.
The profound differences between Aeschylus and Sophocles are not
theological and it is difficult to agree with those who find in the god who
tells Orestes, "you must kill your mother"^ ^^ a kinder, gentler Apollo than
the god who tells Oedipus, "you will kill your father." What is new—and
far from comforting—in Sophocles is his assessment, gloomy even by
Greek standards, of the limits of human knowledge. The ignorance of
Sophoclean characters runs through a broad spectrum: Oedipus mistakes his
parents for strangers, homecoming for exile and hereditary kingship for
unconstitutional rule; Creon in Antigone twice mistakes the priorities of the
living for those of the dead;^^^ Deianira mistakes a poison for a love-potion;
and Ajax mistakes a sheep for Agamemnon. In Sophocles humans deceive
one anotheri^"* and people act with a self-confidence unwarranted by their
feeble grasp of reality. Only once does a god deceive: Athena in Ajax (51-
52), and her deception, motivated by retribution (762-77), prevents a crime
from being committed. It is in his anthropology rather than his theology
that the uncompromising quality of Sophocles' world consists.
The function of art, according to Dodds, quoting Dr. Johnson, is "the
enlargement of our sensibility."'*^ This phrase is perhaps too broad to
i°5 Dodds 43 = 71.
>i° Dodds 43 =71.
^'^Naliviiies: Find. 01. 1. 26-27. 6. 39-47, 7. 35-38, Nem. 1. 35-^7; inventors:
Find. 01. 1. 40-45. 7. 42, 13. 17-22. Pyth. 2. 32, 4. 217, 12. 6-8 and see A.
Kleingiiniher, "npcoroq Evperfiq," Philologus Suppl. 26 (1933) and K. Thraede. "Das Lob
des Erfinders: Bemerkungen zur Analyse der Heuremata-Kalaloge." Rh. Mus. 105 (1962)
158-86; napaKOTta npoxronrmajv (Aesch. Ag. 223). See B. A. van Groningen. In the
Grip of the Past (Leiden 1953) 122.
1*2 Aesch. Cho. 269-96. 900-02. 953-56. 1029-30, Eum. 798-99.
113 Firstly at Ant. 113-m. 1068-71; secondly at 1192-1205.
^^*Aj. 646-92, Trach. 249-90, 569-77, El. 680-763. Phil. 343-90.
11^ Dodds 45, 49 = 74, 77. This curious doctrine of enlarged sensibility was no mere
temporary aberration of Dodds' thought, for he had enunciated it years before in Euripides.
Bacchae (Oxford 1944) xliii = 2nd ed. (1960) xlvii. Dodds does not specify the source of
this quotation, but David Sansone has most plausibly suggested to me that it is an
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capture the specific virtue of tragic drama. The virtue of tragedy lies
elsewhere, in a region suggested by the examination question set by Dodds
for his undergraduates, namely, in adding understanding to our spontaneous
emotional response, in order to assert eternal providence, and justify the
ways of God to men.
Queen's University, Kingston
inaccurate quotation from memory of Johnson's Life of Waller §139: "From poetry the
reader justly expects, and from good poetry always obtains, the enlargement of his
comprehension and elevation of his fancy."
